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September 11 and the subsequent wars 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 
current fight against Al Qaeda and ISIS� 
One of the great strengths of this book is 
the way Bacevich brings all these events 
together in sufficient detail to enable 
the reader to take in “the whole picture�” 
It allows one to put these events into 
greater context and see the patterns that 
have developed� In short, it performs 
a very complete assessment of where 
we have been, what assumptions the 
leaders of the United States have made, 
what policy decisions were made on the 
basis of those assumptions, and what 
the outcomes have been to this time�
Toward the book’s end, Bacevich asks 
two very pointed questions� First, why 
“has the world’s mightiest military 
achieved so little even while itself 
absorbing very considerable losses and 
inflicting even greater damage on the 
subjects of America’s supposed be-
neficence?” Second, why, “in the face of 
such unsatisfactory outcomes[,] has the 
United States refused to chart a different 
course?” Bacevich goes on to offer what 
he believes are the answers to these 
questions, then ends by arguing that, in 
light of new technology that allows more 
oil reserves to become accessible in the 
Western Hemisphere, the United States 
would be better served by securing 
its “own neighborhood rather than 
vainly attempting to police the Greater 
Middle East�” The question that comes to 
mind—one with which I’m sure our na-
tional leaders wrestle—is this: What will 
happen to this region, and subsequently 
the world, if the United States stops its 
involvement in the Greater Middle East?
This well-researched book is a must-
read for all of us who study, plan, and 
execute the military arm of national 
power—and especially for those who 
make decisions about national policy�
ROGER DUCEY
Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, 
ed� Richard D� Hooker Jr� and Joseph J� Collins� 
Washington, DC: National Defense Univ� Press, 
2015� 486 pages� $21�95�
Augmenting the literature of firsthand 
accounts by senior leaders such as 
General Stanley McChrystal and 
Ambassador Christopher Hill, National 
Defense University faculty members 
Richard Hooker and Joseph Collins 
assembled a strong team to make sense 
of the last fifteen years of war� The edi-
tors appreciate the challenges of writing 
current history, but offer the book as “an 
assessment of two unfinished cam-
paigns, written for future senior officers, 
their key advisors, and other national 
security professionals�” With more than 
three million U�S� and coalition veterans 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, few undertak-
ings are more important� Veterans of 
today will shape the future of defense 
over the next twenty years, just as their 
forebears, such as Anthony Zinni, Colin 
Powell, and Richard Holbrooke, were 
shaped by their Vietnam experiences�
The chapters are at their best when 
they leverage insights from both senior 
military and civilian leaders to reach 
important conclusions, such as the 
following: “Civilian national security de-
cisionmakers need a better understand-
ing of the complexity of military strategy 
and the military’s need for planning 
guidance� Senior military officers for 
their part require a deep understanding 
of the interagency decisionmaking 
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process, an appreciation for the perspec-
tives and frames of reference of civilian 
counterparts, and a willingness to 
embrace and not resist the complexities 
and challenges inherent in the system of 
civilian control” (p� 71)� On this point, 
it would be important to learn from the 
productive relationships of Lieutenant 
General David Barno and Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad in Kabul during 2003, 
and General David Petraeus and Ambas-
sador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad during 
2007� The editors capture the important 
civil-military relations discussion in 
their conclusion, writing that “there is 
no ‘purely military’ question � � � [yet the 
advice of senior military personnel as 
experts] was not used in full” (p� 407)�
The book raises—and sometimes chal-
lenges—persistent myths, such as the 
belief that the presence of an additional 
battalion at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in 
2001 would have enabled the capture 
of Osama Bin Laden� Others addressed 
include the belief that Kabul could have 
stood on its own in the early part of last 
decade, and that a post-Saddam Iraq 
would be lawless� Further, the book 
reminds us that these two wars did not 
begin as insurgencies; that military 
gains were disconnected from political 
goals; and that the U�S� government has 
neither the capacity nor the disposition 
to promote political and economic 
development on par with its capacity to 
develop foreign military forces� Neither 
U�S� presidential administration could 
agree on the scope of the problem 
nor could either generate the unity 
of effort that we see—in hindsight—
would have been needed to stabilize 
either country� Consequently, the 
United States abandoned its grandiose 
national objectives and shifted 
its emphasis to training Iraqis and 
Afghans to fight their own civil wars�
Among the volume’s contributors and 
chapters, the reviewer particularly  
notes the following:
• Thomas X� Hammes explores well the 
challenges of security force assistance, 
concluding that “the personnel system 
never really adjusted � � � [and advisers 
and trainers were] working against 
incredible handicaps” (p� 335)�
• Collins’s chapter on initial planning 
for the wars lays out the assump-
tions made and the ill-conceived 
expectations that developed� At times 
he reconciles Beltway and theater 
perspectives; for instance, “DOD 
civilian leadership did not want to 
admit—perhaps for public relations or 
legal reasons—that by mid-summer 
2003, there was an insurgency going 
on” (p� 65)�
• Frank G� Hoffman and G� Alexander 
Crowther follow with an important 
assessment of the Iraq and Afghan 
surges, providing a rich narrative that 
illustrates strategic adaptation� They 
conclude that “war is an audit of how 
well states have formulated policies 
and strategies, and how well prepared 
their armed forces and other tools are” 
(p� 146)�
• To examine the political context of 
strategy formulation during the wars, 
the chapter by Christopher J� Lamb 
and Megan Franco analyzes senior 
leaders’ decisions� The authors “con-
clude that critical strategy handicaps, 
insufficient unity of effort, and, to a 
lesser extent, missing or late-to-need 
capabilities for irregular warfighting 
offer a compelling explanation for 
why the United States was not able to 
fully achieve its goals in Afghanistan 
and Iraq” (p� 168)�
• Nicholas Rostow and Harvey  
Rishikof identify legal lessons from 
the wars, noting that “lawyers should 
be regarded as essential participants in 
the planning process” (p� 378)�
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To be sure, there are limits to how 
much we should draw from these two 
conflicts, especially since they have not 
ended yet� Furthermore, the editors 
acknowledge that whatever lessons 
might be learned will not necessarily 
prevent future failures� While the two 
conflicts are linked temporally, differing 
rationales for beginning them, differ-
ent presidential administrations, and 
different adversaries limit the value of 
larger comparisons� Inputs from our 
allies and erstwhile partners—absent 
here—also would be beneficial to 
study� Yet the book is rich in detail and 
analysis, all underscoring the lesson of 
a decade-plus: that, while the United 
States might be able to support and 
enable its international partners, it 
cannot solve all their problems by itself�
DEREK S� REVERON
Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspec-
tive, ed� Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Peter 
Dombrowski� Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ� Press, 
2015� 328 pages� $29�95�
As a collective voice on the topic, 
Regional Missile Defense from a Global 
Perspective offers a comprehensive 
discussion of the history, development, 
and present state of ballistic missile 
defense (BMD), infused with a distinc-
tive blend of technical aspects and 
analysis of the geopolitical forces that 
shaped it� Using the Reagan administra-
tion’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
as an initial framework for discussion, 
the works of several notable experts 
in the fields of international studies, 
nuclear policy, national defense, 
foreign affairs, and political science are 
combined to yield a nuanced overview 
of the subject, expertly delineating the 
parallel development of technological 
advances and ongoing political realities 
for participating nations� Threaded 
throughout the book are significant 
discussions on the implications of a 
regionally based missile-defense system 
having more than just a regional impact�
On the basis of operational concepts 
developed to protect London from 
V-2 rockets during World War II, 
U�S� efforts initially were envisioned 
to protect select cities from Soviet or 
Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) attacks� When this proved to be 
technically and financially prohibitive, 
scaled-back systems designed primarily 
to defend ICBM sites and their capabili-
ties for strategic offensive operations 
were constructed� Arms-limitation 
talks between the superpowers during 
the early seventies further reduced 
the scope of this capability� However, 
because of President Reagan’s concern 
during his presidency about the lack of 
an effective BMD for the country and 
his preference for a strategic alternative 
to mutually assured destruction, SDI 
was developed� With the overall goal of 
eliminating the threat posed by Soviet 
ICBMs, all aspects of ongoing research 
were combined under one program�
This point in history is the starting point 
for the book; from there it begins to 
construct the foundation for an exami-
nation of the technological challenges of 
developing a missile defense and the po-
litical realities these developments foster� 
Part 1, “U�S� Policies and Programs” 
(p� 17), starts with an examination of 
BMD policies as they evolved during the 
Ronald Reagan, George H� W� Bush, Bill 
Clinton, and George W� Bush admin-
istrations and some of the documents 
that defined the actual threat, examined 
technical controversies, and captured 
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   156 2/22/17   9:32 AM
3
Hooker et al.: Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
